VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS ON THE IMAGE-BASED AUTHENTICATION: THROUGH THE WM_INPUT MESSAGE

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ABSTRACT

We verified the exposure of the mouse data using the WM_INPUT message handler that extracts the mouse-inputted data to analyze the vulnerability of the image-based authentication. Consequently, the mouse data were exposed on most of the banking and payment sites of South Korea. Therefore, we proved that the safety of the authentication information is vulnerable, even when image-based authentication is applied.

Keywords: Vulnerability analysis, Mouse data, Image-based authentication, WM_INPUT message

1. INTRODUCTION

The mouse, one of the input devices, facilitates a user application with more convenience and a greater editing capability compared with the keyboard [1]. Previously, the identification (ID)/password-based authentication was mainly used whereby the user inputs the password using the keyboard. The keyboard information, however, can be exposed by attackers, thereby causing a keyboard security problem [11, 12] furthermore, the password can be guessed [10]. As the problem of the keyboard-data exposure has been consequently revealed, more secure authentication methods have been required.

Image-based authentication has emerged as a way of solving the previously described problem. The image-based authentication is an authentication method that uses the specific coordinates of screen-displayed clicked image as the authentication information [13]. This method solves the problem of the ID/password-based authentication because the authentication information is not inputted from the keyboard; accordingly, the image-based authentication method is increasingly applied.

Nevertheless, the mouse data can also be exposed, and this occurs in the same way as the keyboard-data problem. The first emergence of the mouse-information exposure is due to the easy online attainment of mouse loggers. Moreover, the problem regarding the highest-level attack is the exposure of the mouse coordinates through the usage of the GetCursorPos() function which is one of the Windows application programming interfaces (APIs). That is, it appears the image-based authentication overcomes the problem of keyboard-information exposure based on the ID/password-based authentication, but this method is also problematic due to the corresponding exposure of the mouse authentication information [14].

Therefore, an analysis of the vulnerability posed by the tracing of the mouse position for which the WM_INPUT message handler [15], one of the keyboard and mouse messages supported by the Microsoft Windows operating system (OS), is used was performed for this paper. Further, a demonstration of the mouse-data safety is presented based on the high-priority services such as the e-commerce and Internet-banking services, whereby the proof-of-concept tool is implemented.

2. RELATED WORK

2.1 Image-based authentication

The image-based authentication utilizes the click information of a screen-displayed image as the password. This authentication is mostly used for e-commerce and Internet-banking services where sensitive user information is inputted. For this reason, the displayed image and the mouse position that constitute the most important information must be protected [2, 3].

This authentication method is provided by various types depending on the displayed image,
and the representative types are the virtual keyboard and keypad.

![Example of the mage-based authentication](image)

As shown in Figure 1, the user inputs the password by clicking on the letter or number corresponding to the registered password based on the screen-displayed image. Namely, the image-based authentication is closely related to the image and the clicked mouse information. Nevertheless, the corresponding researches on the information security are insufficient. Consequently, this paper presents an assessment of the security of the image-based authentication that was conducted based on the mouse information.

2.2 Existing attack techniques of the mouse data exposure

The mouse logger, which is a compound word comprising he mouse and the logger, displays the mouse movements as coordinates, and records the history of specific features such as the click information [4].

The information that is obtained from the usage of the mouse logger includes the coordinate position, cursor confirmation, and input window, and it is possible to decide whether or not the information is exposed in a comprehensive manner. The coordinate position denotes the position of the mouse coordinate, and the cursor confirmation and the input window denote the cursor output and the input-window output, respectively, at the post-recording replay time. Therefore, if this information is exposed, the user-inputted mouse information is also exposed, thereby neutralizing the image-based authentication.

Consequently, the attacker can trace the mouse movements using the mouse logger, so the mouse-data exposure has been researched using a mouse logger that is easy to obtain from the Internet. As a result, this research verified that, regarding many Internet-banking services, the passwords can be stolen through the exposing of the mouse data [5]. As shown in Table 1, four representative mouse loggers were used to evaluate mouse-data exposure for six Internet-banking services. In terms of the evaluation, one mouse logger did not obtain the coordinate position; however, the remaining mouse loggers extracted the cursor confirmation and the input window as well as the coordinate position, thereby making it possible to expose the password.

The Microsoft Windows OS provides various APIs to manage and support the mouse position, and the GetCursorPos() function provides the current mouse position in the form of the x and y coordinates. Thus, if the attacker collects the x and y coordinates by calling the GetCursorPos() function periodically, he or she can trace the user-inputted mouse movements. The detailed attack process, also shown in Figure 2, is described as follows:

1. Phase 1: The attacker captures the screen.
2. Phase 2: The periodically calling of the GetCursorPos() function to extract the coordinates.
3. Phase 3: The click information is extracted by the event handler to show the clicked-image coordinates.
4. Phase 4: The attacker can steal the user-inputted authentication information by aggregating the extracted screen image, mouse coordinates, and clicked position.

As a result, this study verified the password exposure by exposing the mouse data on a real e-commerce site [6].

Table 1: Result of the mouse-logger mouse-data exposure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mouse Loggers</th>
<th>Company A</th>
<th>Company B</th>
<th>Company C</th>
<th>Company D</th>
<th>Company E</th>
<th>Company F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logger A</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logger B</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logger C</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logger D</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.3 Existing defense techniques of the mouse data exposure

As previously mentioned, the attack techniques has been for the neutralization of the image-based authentication for which the calling of the GetCursorPos() function in enacted have been researched.

This attack is exploits a vulnerability that can be obtained using the onscreen x and y coordinates in the calling of the GetCursorPos() function. To counteract this vulnerability, a defense technique that can prevent the mouse position exposure has been studied [6]. This technique is the disturbance of the attacker by the random generation of arbitrary coordinates, but it does not prevent the extraction of the mouse position so the attacker cannot know the correct coordinates. The detailed defense process, also shown in Figure 3, is described as follows:

Phase 1: The protection program displays the screen image for the password selection.

Phase 2: The current mouse position, which is the start position, is stored to track the actual mouse position.

Phase 3: The protection program generates ransom mouse coordinates by calling the SetCursorPos() function to prevent the attacker from stealing the real mouse positions.
Phase 4: Lastely, the protection program obtains the real mouse positions by self-filtering the generated random coordinates.

Accordingly, it is possible to protect against the attack without exposing the mouse position.

3. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

As described previously, the image-based authentication has problems that are related to the exposure of the mouse data. The password is stolen through the replaying of the mouse coordinates for which the mouse logger, which records the coordinates, is used. In particular, mouse loggers can be easily obtained from the Internet, making this type of attack a serious vulnerability, because the attacker does not need to implement attack tools. The Windows OS manages the mouse position to create the events according to the user mouse input, and the mouse position is obtained by calling the GetCursorPos() function in the event handler. Therefore, the attacker can track the mouse movements by calling this function periodically, thereby enabling the theft of the user-inputted password.

For the GetCursorPos() function attack counteraction, a defensive method that hides the real mouse position by generating random positions has been researched. The Windows OS provides the SetCursorPos() function to set the mouse position, and it can set random mouse positions by calling this function. This technique prevents the mouse-position exposure by mingling the real and random mouse positions.

The SetCursorPos() function defense technique, however, is a high-level defense technique. For this reason, if the attacker traces the mouse data that are inputted using the mouse device, instead of the OS-managed mouse location, additional vulnerabilities can be revealed that lead to the mouse-data exposure, and these new vulnerabilities can neutralize the image-based authentication. Therefore, for this paper, an analysis of this vulnerability was performed through a verification of the mouse-data exposure using the WM_INPUT message handler, which is the keyboard and mouse messages that are supported by the Microsoft Windows OS.

3.1 Attack scenario

The Microsoft Windows OS provides the WM_INPUT message to support the user-inputted keyboard data and the mouse position [7]. When the WM_INPUT message handler is registered, the handler receives the information that is inputted from the keyboard and mouse in the form of the RAWINPUT structure [8]. The RAWINPUT structure that is shown in Figure 4 shares the data of the mouse, keyboard, and human interface device (HID). The transferred mouse data in the form of the RAWMOUSE structure is shown in Figure 5 [9]. The uLastX and uLastY denote the relative mouse-position coordinates. Therefore, the attacker can trace the mouse position by periodically collecting the uLastX and uLastY after the registration of the WM_INPUT message handler. Figure 3 shows an attack scenario, and the detailed attack process is described as follows:

![Figure 4: RAWINPUT structure](image1)

```c
typedef struct tagRAWINPUT {
    RAWINPUTHEADER header;
    union {
        RAWMOUSE mouse;
        RAWKEYBOARD keyboard;
        RAWHID hid;
    } data;
} RAWINPUT, *PRAWINPUT, *LPRAWINPUT;
```

![Figure 5: RAWMOUSE structure](image2)

```c
typedef struct tagRAWMOUSE {
    USHORT usFlags;
    union {
        ULONG ulButtons;
        struct {
            USHORT usButtonFlags;
            USHORT usButtonDownData;
        };
        ULONG ulRawButtons;
        LONG lLastX;
        LONG lLastY;
        ULONG ulExtraInformation;
    } RAWMOUSE, *PRAWMOUSE, *LPRAWMOUSE;
```

Phase 1: The attack program registers the WM_INPUT event handler that is provided by the Windows OS. As previously described, in this handler the OS handles the data received from the input device, such as the keyboard and the mouse, and passes the results to the higher-level application. In the case of the mouse, the device generally transfers the relative coordinates, depending on the configured state. That is, the attack program registers the WM_INPUT message handler, and then the program receives the relative coordinates corresponding to the current position from the OS.
When the attacker starts the attack, the attack program captures the displayed image and obtains the current mouse position. Accordingly, if the relative coordinates that are transmitted by the OS via the handler are collected based on the obtained current position, the mouse-position movements can be tracked.

Phase 2: The user moves the mouse device to choose a position corresponding to the registered password in the screen-displayed image. In this movement process, the relative coordinates, which are the mouse data, are transferred from the mouse device to the OS. The relative coordinates include the screen-relative x and y coordinates. The number of the x coordinate is positive during the right-direction movement, and negative during the left-direction movement. The number of y coordinate is negative during the upward movement, and it is positive during the downward movement.

Phase 3: When the OS receives the data from the mouse device, the system processes the received data that are to be system-managed. In this process, the OS calculates the mouse coordinates that are to be managed, and carries out the process to transfer the mouse data to the application program.

Phase 4: The OS transfers the handled mouse data to the attack program that registered the WM_INPUT message event.

Phase 5: The attack program receives the relative coordinates from the OS. The program traces the mouse movements by calculating the relative coordinates based on the absolute coordinates. Because the absolute coordinate are called current coordinates, they are stored in the phase 1.

Based on the attack scenario, an analysis of the possibility of the mouse-data exposure in the image-based authentication was performed. The analysis result shows that the user-inputted mouse data can be captured, and the mouse movements can be successfully tracked. It is necessary, however, to analyze the attack vector in the situations where the defense technique using the SetCursorPos() function described in the section 2.3 is applied.

3.2 Analysis of the attack vectors

In this paper, the three attack vectors that are shown in Figure 7 are defined as follows: the no-defense technique, the running-defense technique, and the mouse input between the random-coordinate generation.
The no-defense technique is a vector in which the proposed attack technique steals the coordinates when the mouse data are inputted in the case of an inactive defense program. In this vector, the OS enacts the WM_INPUT event upon the transferal of the mouse data \((X_{t1}, Y_{t1})\), and then the event handler receives the inputted mouse data \((X_{t1}, Y_{t1})\). Therefore, the attacker succeeds using this vector.

The running-defense technique is a vector that bypasses the defense technique by filtering generated random coordinates of the defense program while the defense program is running. In the case of the vector of the no-defense technique, even though the mouse-device coordinates are successfully received, if the generated random coordinates of the defense program are not filtered, the attack is not successful, because the attack program does not receive the mouse-inputted real coordinates. In this vector, the attack program does not invoke the WM_INPUT event that receives the mouse data from the operating system when the defense program generates random coordinates. That is, the proposed attack technique bypasses the defense technique using the SetCursorPos() function in this vector because the attack program does not receive the generated random coordinates of the defense program.
The mouse-input vector between the generated random coordinates is a vector that obtains the coordinates when the coordinates are transferred from the mouse device during generation of the random coordinates. When the defense program generates the random coordinates, such as the vector of the running-defense technique, the OS does not invoke the WM_INPUT event that receives the mouse data. At this point, if the mouse data \((X_{r2}, Y_{r2})\) is inputted, the attack program receives the inputted mouse data \((X_{r2}, Y_{r2})\) from the registered WM_INPUT message handler. Therefore, the attacker succeeds using this vector.

3.3 Experiment result

The proof-of-concept tool that traces the mouse position using the WM_INPUT message handler was implemented based on the previously described attack scenario and the attack vector of the no-defense technique, and Figure 8 shows the experiment result. The result shows the exposure of the mouse data in terms of a virtual keyboard that has been applied on a real e-commerce website, and Table 2 shows that the proposed attack technique was used to evaluate mouse-data exposure to six Internet-banking services. As a result, the mouse data were exposed on all websites.

![Figure 8: Experiment result](image)

### Table 2: The exposure result of mouse data using the WM_INPUT MESSAGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Exposure result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company A</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company C</td>
<td>O</td>
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<td>Company D</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company E</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company F</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The experiment result according to the attack vectors shows that the vector of the no-defense technique is the same as the result shown in Figure 8. Here, all the user-inputted mouse data were exposed.

The experiment result of the vector of the running-defense technique is shown in Table 3. The result shows the collection of the WM_INPUT events and the received coordinates upon the generation of the random coordinates of 10, 100, 1000, 10000, and 100000. Consequently, all the cases do not invoke any events or received coordinates.

The experiment result of the vector of the mouse input between the generations of the random coordinates, for which a total of 10 tests was experimented with, is shown in Table 4. To analyze the correlation between the generated random coordinates and the received coordinates, the number of the generated random coordinates, the number of the filtered coordinates, the number of the invoked WM_INPUT events, and the number of the received coordinates from the event handler were collected, and the random coordinates were generated every 5ms.

The overall result shows a difference between the number of the filtered coordinates and the number of the coordinates that were received from the WM_INPUT message handler. The corresponding reason is the difference between the attainments of the current coordinates every 5ms in the defense technique and the number of the coordinates that were transferred from the mouse.

In the comparison of the number of the coordinates that were received from the WM_INPUT event handler and the number of the invoked WM_INPUT events, all of the 10 tests are the same. Therefore, the attack program receives all WM_INPUT messages invoked from the OS, meaning the attacker can track the mouse movements.

### Table 3: Experiment result according to the attack vector of the running defense technique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of generated random coordinates</th>
<th>Number of invoked WM_INPUT events</th>
<th>Number of received coordinates from the event handler</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Experiment result according to the attack vector of the mouse input between the generation of the random coordinates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Defense technique using the <code>SetCursorPos()</code> function</th>
<th>Attack technique using the WM_INPUT message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of generated random coordinates</td>
<td>Number of filtered coordinates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 1</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 2</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 3</td>
<td>1195</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 4</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 5</td>
<td>1360</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 6</td>
<td>1486</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 7</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 8</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 9</td>
<td>1702</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 10</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. CONCLUSION

The exposure of the mouse data from the usage of the WM_INPUT message handler, which extracts the mouse data to analyze the vulnerability of the image-based authentication, has been verified in this paper. As a result, the mouse data were exposed on most of the Internet-banking and e-commerce sites of South Korea. Therefore, it has been proven that the safety of the authentication information is not ensured even if the image-based authentication is applied, and the corresponding attack countermeasures will be studied in the future.

DISCLOSURE:

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