



ANOMALY BASED INTRUSION DETECTION IN WLAN USING DISCRIMINATION ALGORITHM COMBINED WITH NAÏVE BAYESIAN CLASSIFIER

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ABSTRACT

The role of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) has been inevitable in the area of Information and Network security – especially for building a good network defense infrastructure. Due to the wide popularity of Wireless Networks tremendous applications are emerging and Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) has gained attention by both research and industry communities. The wide spread deployment of WLAN has also brought new challenges to security and privacy. We need to distinguish anomalies that change the traffic either abruptly or slowly. Anomaly based intrusion detection technique is one of the building blocks of such a foundation. In this paper, the attempt has been made to apply correlation coefficient based learning approach for detecting anomalies in wireless Local area network. While a good amount of research has been done for fixed wired networks, not much research has been done in this area for wireless networks due to lack of a good dataset. Hence we developed a discrimination algorithm using correlation coefficient to detect anomalies combined with Naïve Bayesian classifier in the Wireless traffic and demonstrated the effectiveness using Kyoto 2006+ datasets. An experiment is carried out in order to evaluate performance based on accuracy, detection rate and false positive rate of the classification scheme. Results and analysis shows that the proposed approach has enhanced the detection rate with minimum false positive rates.

Keywords: *Intrusion Detection, Anomaly Detection, Correlation Coefficient, Naïve Bayesian Classifier, Wireless Network.*

1. INTRODUCTION

A wide range of attacks and threats are increasing day by day along with rapidly growing network technologies and the Internet. Uncontrolled databases and web servers have been constantly targeted by intruders. In this context, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) has been established as the most important component of the whole network security and defense system. IDSs can detect serious security threats as well as unwanted activities like gaining unauthorized access to files and network resources. While an IDS is also capable of sending early alarms upon risk exposure caused by any attack, at the same time it has also potential to generate high volume of false alarms. In recent years, data mining approaches have been proposed and used as detection techniques for discovering anomalies and unknown attacks. These approaches have resulted in high accuracy and good detection rates but with moderate false alarm on novel attacks. In addition, some attacks and normal connections are

not detected correctly. Hence, there is a need to detect and identify such normal instances and attacks accurately in an interconnected network [3]. This paper has mainly reviewed the research works that have adopted from data mining approaches to detect novel attacks.

Network Anomaly refers to network behavior which deviates from normal network behavior. Anomalies occurs due to causes like system mis-configuration, implementation bugs, denial of service attacks, network overload, file server failures, etc. The main detection scheme of most commercial intrusion detection systems is misuse detection, where known bad behaviors (attacks) are encoded into signatures, and in anomaly detection normal behaviour of users or the protected system is modelled, often using machine learning or data mining techniques rather than given signatures. During detection new data is matched against the normality model, and deviations are marked as anomalies. Since no knowledge of attacks is needed to train the normality model, misuse detection system cannot



detect unknown attacks, but anomaly detection may detect previously unknown attacks. The training of the normality model for anomaly detection may be performed by a variety of different techniques like clustering based, statistics based etc. and many approaches have been evaluated.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we reviewed related work. Section 3 describes about Wireless LAN standards and various types of wireless attacks. Section 4 illustrates about data collection section 5 gives a detailed study on Discrimination algorithm and Naïve Baseyan Classifier Section 6 discusses the Experiment and analysis and section 7 describes about the Performance measures. The last section summarizes the whole work.

2. RELATED RESEARCH WORK

Dokas ,Ertoz kumar ,Srivasta[3] developed algorithms using outlier detection schemes. They conducted experiments on KDDCUP 99 dataset and concluded that LOF approach was the most promising technique for detecting novel intrusions. Zhang and Lee[4] first presented a distributed intrusion detection and response architecture for wireless ad hoc networks, which provides an excellent guide for the later works. M Thottan et. al.[5] proposed a proactive network anomaly detection model. They defined a set of proactively detectable anomalies in terms of management information base variables and the time series data obtained from these variables when they are analyzed by a signal processor. This work is shown to be amenable to distributed implementation and is a promising approach to self-managed networks. A data mining approach to network intrusion detection provides an opportunity to learn the behaviours of network users by mining the data trails of their activities. While recent research e.g., Clustering, MADAM ID , ADAM , MINDS , have investigated data mining for intrusion detection, considerable challenges remain unexplored. This involves intrusion detection models for wireless networks not requiring hard-to-get training data in wired network environment, as well as intrusion detection that has no prior knowledge of relationships between attack types and attributes of the network audit data. One of the most recent wired IDS by Zhong et al[4].Multiple centroid based unsupervised Online K-Means clustering algorithm for intrusion detection, with a simple yet effective self-labelling heuristic for detecting

attack and normal clusters of network traffic audit data. Some of the drawbacks of this Zhong et al. work are: they used only metrics available in the recorded wireless logs rather than all that are theoretically required to model common wireless attacks. While these methods can detect anomalies that cause unpredicted changes in the network traffic, they may be deceived by attacks that increase their traffic slowly. Our work can detect anomalies regardless of the speed of the network traffic.

The primary contributions of this study are:

- A detailed survey of possible WLAN attacks illustrates the need of IDS
- Wireless network traffic data collection using Wireshark demonstrates the volume of network traffic data.
- Implementation of Correlation Coefficient based discrimination algorithm followed by Naïve Bayesian classification describes similarity of normal traffic and abnormality in the traffic which helps to detect anomalies in the wireless network

3. 802.11 STANDARD AND VARIOUS WIRELESS ATTACKS

IEEE 802.11 defines the wireless LAN (WLAN) standard. Details about this standard can be obtained from (802.11 LAN/MAN 1999). IEEE 802.11 focuses on the Physical and Medium Access Control (MAC) layers of the WLANs. 802.11 standard is designed to support mobility, provide fault tolerance, and allow all network protocols to run over WLAN.

There are three main types of 802.11 frames:

- Management frames enable stations to establish and maintain communications
- Control frames assist in the delivery of data frames between stations.
- Data frame carries packets from higher layers, such as web pages, printer control data, etc., within the body of the frame.

IEEE 802.11 MAC layer is common for all the three different physical layer spectrums. It can be considered as an interface between the physical layer and the device. Detailed description of each of these fields is provided in (802.11b LAN/MAN 1999). A brief description is as follows:

Frame Control: Gives the protocol version and frame type.

Duration ID: This has two meanings. When the station is in power save mode it represents the Station ID otherwise it represents the duration



value, which is used for Network Allocation Vector (NAV) calculation.

Address Fields: There can be up to four address fields depending on the *ToDS* and the *FromDS* field values. These are defined in the Frame Control Field.

Sequence Control: It is further divided into two subfields, Fragment Number and Sequence Number. Sequence Number defines the frame and Fragment Number defines the number of the fragments in the frame.

CRC: It represents the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). It is a 32-bit field.

3.1. Wireless Attacks

Wireless intrusions belong to four broad categories, namely: (1) *Passive attacks* (2) *Active attacks* (3) *Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack* (4) *Jamming attacks*. A *Passive attack* (e.g., war driving) occurs when someone listens to (or eavesdrops) on network traffic. Armed with a wireless network adaptor that supports promiscuous mode, the eavesdropper can capture network traffic for analysis using easily available tools, such as Network Monitor. War driving is the act of searching unsecured Wi-Fi networks by a person with a Wi-Fi equipped computer. As long as somebody is sniffing the network packets and trying to discover some useful information from gathered packets (e.g., WEP key used in the network or available open ports), we classify these activities as passive attacks. Once this information is discovered through passive attacks, then hackers can launch some active attacks. *Active attacks* launched by hackers who access the network to launch these active attacks include unauthorized access, Denial of Service (DoS) and Flooding attacks like (SYNchronized) SYN Flood attacks, and (User Datagram Protocol) UDP Flood attacks. DoS attack attempts to engage a host of computer resources so that these resources are not available to other users. DoS is an attack in which the attacker keeps the resource too busy or too full to handle other legitimate requests, and thus, it denies legitimate users access to a machine. The attacker's IP address is fake and destination IP address is the server victim's address. Receiving so many packets from attacker prevents victim from accepting new legitimate requests and may crash the victim server.

Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack entails placing a rogue AP (Access Point) within range of wireless stations. If the attacker knows the SSID in use by the network (which is easily

discoverable) and the rogue AP has enough strength, wireless users have no way of knowing that they are connecting to an unauthorized AP. Because of their undetectable nature, the only defense against rogue APs is vigilance through frequent site surveys using tools such as Netstumbler and AiroPeek, and physical security. *Jamming* is a special kind of DoS attack specific to wireless networks. Jamming occurs when spurious RF (Radio Frequency) frequencies interfere with the operation of the wireless network. Intentional and malicious jamming occurs when an attacker analyzes the spectrum being used by wireless networks and then transmits a powerful signal to interfere with communication on the discovered frequencies. Fortunately, this kind of attack is not very common because of the expense of acquiring hardware capable of launching jamming attacks and it leads to a lot of time and effort being expended merely to disable communications. Many researches were done for sniffing the network using open source tools and detecting MAC address spoofing and in our work we try to propose a method to detect active attacks using discrimination algorithms.

A variety of tools have been developed for the purpose of network anomaly detection. Some detect anomalies by matching the traffic pattern or the packets using a set of predefined rules that describe characteristics of the anomalies. The cost of applying these approaches is proportional to the size of the rule set as well as the complexity of the individual rules, which affects the scalability of these approaches. Furthermore they are not sensitive to anomalies that have not been previously defined. Our work is a traffic analysis on the network data which requires little computation.

4. DATA COLLECTION

The general unavailability of benchmark data on wireless attacks (i.e., data with known attack types) calls for the creation of new models for wireless network intrusion detection. Hence we propose the correlation based approach to detect the suspicious traffic.

A real wireless network may be much complex with more client stations, Access points and other wireless equipments. So we simulated the wireless network by configuring 200 nodes in NS-2. (Figure-1)




Fig.1 Simulated Wireless Network Using NS-2

The traces of wireless traffic are observed for a particular fixed period(e.g 3 minutes). The adversary nodes were created randomly. Since the traffic has many Probe request ,response , Association , and Disassociation frames, feature extraction was done on the collected traffic. The correlation between the pairs of traffic data records are calculated .

Real time Wireless traffic of Wi-Fi Lab with 120 nodes and 10 Access points are captured using Wireshark(Figure.2). Three weeks of the traces are observed and the extracted features are used for anomaly detection.




Fig.2. Wireless Network Traffic Collection

4.1. Selection Of Data

The Entire experiment is carried out using the data sets collected in Wireless Lab using Wireshark ,Simulated datasets of NS-2 and Kyoto 2006+ bench mark data set.

Selection of experimental data set:

- 3 -weeks traces of Real time wireless network
- Data sets of NS-2
- 2009 July 1, 8, 15 and 22 with 500865 records

4.2. Data Pre-Processing

A few simple and basic data pre-processing techniques like sampling and filtering are applied for the sake of easy and smooth operation of the experiments. Samples with known and unknown attacks are merged together so as to render two types of data only viz. Normal and Attack data.

The categorical attributes of the data are treated differently for clustering They are converted into numerical values e.g. {REJ, S0, RST0, SF} is encoded as {1,2,3,4}.

4.3. The Experimental Procedure

Among the selected Kyoto2006+ dataset, a number of different sized data samples are extracted. Using every data samples, one by one, both Correlation based Clustering and Classification programs are executed. The number of true positive, true negative, false positive and false negative values of the programs are recorded and used in the performance evaluation.

We propose an anomaly detection method similar to the work of Yu,Zhou,Jia,Guo et al. The Algorithm is modified to suit for the wireless traffic. The feature extraction was done on the attributes of network traffic records. This model is proposed to detect all the active attacks such as Man-in-The Middle attack, Denial of Service and Packet modification. The correlation coefficient based discrimination algorithm is shown in detail in Algorithm 1.

The detailed discussion of correlation relationship calculation on traffic data are given below:

The network traffic flow can be represented by a data sequence $X_i[n]$, where i ($i \geq 1$) is the index of network flows, and n denotes the n^{th} element in a data sequence. For example, if the length of a given network traffic flow X_i is N , then the network flow can be expressed as follows.

$$X_i = \{ x_i[1], x_i[2], \dots, x_i[N] \} \quad (1)$$

where $x_i[k]$ ($1 \leq k \leq N$) represents the number of packets that we counted in the k^{th} time interval for the network traffic flow. The correlation is used to describe the similarity of different data sets.

Let X_i and X_j $i \neq j$ be two network flows with the same length N , then the correlation between the two flows is defined as

$$r_{x_i, x_j}[k] = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N x_i[n] x_j[n+k] \quad (2)$$

where k ($k = 0, 1, 2, \dots, N-1$) is the position shift of flow X_j . The correlation coefficient of the two data records has been defined as

$$\rho_{x_i, x_j}[k] = \frac{r_{x_i, x_j}[k]}{\frac{1}{N} \sqrt{\sum_{n=1}^N x_i^2[n] \sum_{n=1}^N x_j^2[n]}} \quad (3)$$



5. SIMILARITY BASED DETECTION METHOD

In this section, we present the similarity based detection method against attacks. Under this framework, the requirement of storage space is very limited and an online decision can be achieved. Our task is to identify whether it is a normal traffic or a suspicious one. According to our proposal, when a possible network start to sample the suspected flows by counting the number of packets for a given time interval, for example, 5 minutes. When the length of a flow N, is suitable, we start to calculate the correlation coefficient between suspected flows.

Suppose we have sampled M network packets, X₁, X₂, . . . , X_M, therefore, we can obtain the correlation coefficient of any two network traffic, X_i(1 ≤ i ≤ M) and X_j (1 ≤ j ≤ M, i ≠ j). Let I_{X_i,X_j} be an indicator for the similarity of the traffic X_i and X_j , and I_{X_i,X_j} has been assigned two possible values: 1 for similar packets [9] and 0 otherwise, be the threshold for the discrimination, then we have

$$I_{X_i, X_j} = \begin{cases} 1, & \rho_{X_i, X_j} |k| \geq \delta \\ 0, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ M, and i ≠ j

In general, we may have more than two suspected flows in a community network. This means we can conduct a number of different pair wise comparisons, and the final decision can be derived from them in order to improve the reliability of our decision. We can therefore find an integrated normal packet data by positive probability as follows.

$$P_r(I_A=1) = \frac{\sum_{1 \leq i, j \leq M, i \neq j} I_{X_i, X_j}}{M^2} \quad (5)$$

where I_A is the indicator for normal packets, and I_A = 1 represents positive for normality. We can set a threshold δ' (0 ≤ δ' ≤ 1) for our global judgement, therefore, we make our final decision with global information as follows.

$$I_A = \begin{cases} 1, & \Pr(I_A = 1) \geq \delta' \\ 0, & \Pr(I_A = 1) < \delta' \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

The value of δ' has an impact on our detection accuracy.

For example, if δ' = 0.6, then it is normal packet if at least 60% of the comparisons are positive.

Algorithm : The Correlation Coefficient based Discrimination Algorithm to Cluster the network traffic

- Step 1. Packet capturing (p_t);
- Step 2. Extracting the necessary features by pairing up the MAC address that uniquely

identifies the client with access point to which it is connected;

Step 3: Parameter Initialization ;

3.1. Initialize N and ;

3.2. X_i = X_j = 0 ;

Step 4: Sampling the extracted features, maximum M collected data records;

for t = 1 to M do

X_t ← Samples of extracted features t;

End

Step 5: Calculating Correlation Coefficient for all suspicious pairs of records ;

foreach i, j ∈ M, i ≠ j do

Calculating correlation coefficient for a pair of suspicious features X_i , X_j ;

for k = 1 to N do

obtain ρ_{X_i,X_j} ;

if δ ≤ ρ_{X_i,X_j} then

I_{X_i,X_j} = 1;

break;

else

k = k + 1 ;

end

end

end

Calculating positive probability Pr(I_A = 1)

step 4: decision on multiple comparisons ;

4.1 if Pr(I_A = 1) ≥ 0.6 then

normal packet;

goto step 1;

else

4.2. Mark it as Suspicious packet ;

4.3. Create cluster based for the

suspicious packet

4.4 Handle the Suspicious packets

separately to Classify using Bayesian

Classification

End

Anomaly detection assumes that intrusions will always reflect some deviations from normal patterns. The assumption here is fixed based on the observation of the wireless traffic.

5.1. Naïve Bayes Classifier

A Naïve Bayes classifier is a simple probabilistic classifier based on applying Bayes' theorem with strong (naïve) independence assumptions. A Naïve Bayes classifier assumes that the presence (or absence) of a particular feature of a class is unrelated to the presence (or absence) of any other feature. Depending on the precise nature of the probability model, Naïve Bayes classifiers can be trained very efficiently in a supervised learning setting.

Bayes Theorem can be expressed as:



$$P(H|X) = P(X|H)P(H) / P(X) \quad (7)$$

Let X be the data record, H be some hypothesis representing data record X , which belongs to a specific class C . For classification, we would like to determine $P(H|X)$, which is the probability that the hypothesis H holds, given an observed data record X . $P(H|X)$ is the posterior probability of H conditioned on X . In contrast, $P(H)$ is the prior probability. The posterior probability $P(H|X)$, is based on more information such as background knowledge than the prior probability $P(H)$, which is independent of X . Similarly, $P(X|H)$ is posterior probability of X conditioned on H . Bayes theorem is useful because it provides ways to calculate the posterior probability $P(H|X)$ from $P(H)$, $P(X)$, and $P(X|H)$.

The Classification Algorithm: -

The overall algorithm consists of two phases – learning phase and classifying (prediction) phase.

Input: D : Data set having n data objects
 C : Set of classes e.g. {Normal; Attack}
 X : Data record to be classified
 H : Hypothesis (that X is classified into C)
Output: The predicted class CNB where X should be classified into.

Pseudo code:

```
// Learning //
For j ← 1 to no. of classes
// Step 1: Calculate prior probabilities of C //
Cj_count ← no. of Di where Di.class_label = j;
P(Cj) ← Cj_count / n;
// Step 2: Calculate prior probabilities of X //
For each attribute value Xl in X
Xl_count ← no. of Xl in Cj;
P(Xl |Cj) ← Xl_count / Cj_count;
EndFor
// Step 3: Calculate posterior probability of X //
P(X) ← average (P(Xl |Cj));
Endfor
// Classifying //
// Step 4: Determine required Naïve Bayes probability //
For j ← 1 to no_of_classes
P(Cj|X) ← P(Cj/H) * P(Cj) / P(X) // Using Eqn. 2
//
Endfor
// Step 5: Get the class with maximum probability //
CNB = max(P(Cj|X))
```

6. PERFORMANCE MEASURES

The performance evaluation of the experiment is carried out in terms of Accuracy (A), Detection Rate (DR) and False Alarm Rate (FAR) by using the following equations:-

$$A = (TP+TN) / (TP+TN+FP+FN)$$

$$DR = (TP) / (TP+FP)$$

$$FAR = (FP) / (FP+TN)$$

Where,

TP = True Positive (attack detected as attack)

TN = True Negative (normal detected as normal)

FP = False Positive (normal detected as attack)

FN = False Negative (attack detected as normal)

The followings tables represent the results showing accuracy, detection rate and false alarm rates of the proposed approach.

Table -1

NO. OF DATA SAMPLES	WIRELESS LAB DATA SETS		
	A (IN %)	DR (IN %)	FAR (IN %)
10000	82.33	87.41	9.89
15000	93.21	87.66	6.45
20000	94.56	89.23	5.12
25000	96.47	89.54	2.91
30000	97.20	92.23	1.82

Table-2

NO. OF DATA SAMPLES	SIMULATED DATA SET (NS-2)		
	A (IN %)	DR (IN %)	FAR (IN %)
10000	95.82	89.25	3.82
15000	96.23	90.28	2.33
20000	96.82	92.45	2.24
25000	97.22	92.65	1.69
30000	98.24	93.65	1.38

Table-3

NO. OF DATA SAMPLES	KYOTO DATA SETS		
	A (IN %)	DR (IN %)	FAR (IN %)
10000	96.6	90.48	3.56
15000	97.21	91.26	2.45
20000	97.42	92.36	1.89
25000	98.11	93.87	1.25
30000	98.44	96.54	1.05

A-Accuracy Alarm Rate DR-Detection Rate FAR=False Alarm Rate

Table -1,2,3 Shows the comparison of Accuracy, Detection Rate, False Alarm Rate of various datasets.

In this work the size of data samples may also be considered as a contributing factor for the overall enhancement. From the above analysis we observed that the accuracy and detection rate are improved whereas False Alarm Rate gets decreased when the number of data samples are increased. Accuracy and Detection Rate increase remarkably when the size of the data samples exceeds a certain value and remain almost constant thereafter.

7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this work, we tried to discriminate the normal and abnormal (anomaly) pattern in the wireless network traffic which is a tough and open problem for researchers. Handling large volume of data to detect the minor deviation in the network traffic is a tedious and a most challenging problem. We found that the normal flow possesses higher similarity compared with that of active attack flow. Generally, it has been observed that the application of Correlation based clustering, followed by Naïve Bayesian classification method is better in terms of the Detection Accuracy as well as in increasing the Detection Rate by reducing the False Alarm Rate in the mean time. It is also learnt that the betterment of the proposed approach becomes more remarkable in case of large datasets. Naïve Bayes Classification is a basic classification scheme and works fine with

good data distribution. But the data distribution model of network intrusion data differs from environment to environment and hence is very hard to predict.

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