AUTOMATIC SELECTION OF FILTERING DEVICES IN A DISTRIBUTED INTRUSION PREVENTION SYSTEM

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ABSTRACT

We presented in a previous article [1] a distributed intrusion prevention system based on honeypots for collecting malicious data. Among important questions to handle there is the choice of filtering device on which a filtering rule has to be applied. In this paper we propose a solution which will allow automatic selection of filtering device in the distributed IPMS platform. These devices will be configured to block unauthorized traffic. This solution must ensure full integration with the IPMS architecture.

Keyword: Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), Distributed System, Network Sensors, Network Filtering

1. INTRODUCTION

Every networked device needs a perimeter level protection against unauthorized accesses. Even for standalone computers, major security vendors give an all in one software integrating an antivirus, a firewall and sometimes host based IDS/IPS. For small networks, the use of a linux based gateway with iptables[2] enabled and squidguard proxy[3] can be enough to have a good level of protection in both network and application levels.

In higher levels of network complexity multiple filtering devices are needed and a well-established framework must exist in the security team to choose on which device a rule must be implemented. When this action is automated, risk of implementing rules on wrong device can have dramatic consequences on business activities.

Through this work we propose a method that takes into consideration the structure of the network to select the device to implement a filtering rule in. The previous work [1] presented the distributed intrusion prevention system (IPMS) based on honeyd[4] for data gathering. The automatic selection of filtering device is very important for IPMS autonomy and reliability.

Deciding if which IP address will be blocked is not in the scope of this article. We will assume that the IP to block was identified and we will name it IPb.

2. NETWORK STRUCTURE

Enterprises’ networks can be structured on different parts that have different security needs and that also have different impact on business when an incident happens. By incident we mean any “… act of violating an explicit or implied security policy” [5].

Most networks can be split into following blocs:

- Demilitarized Zone (DMZ): the DMZ contains servers hosting services for public purpose and that are reachable from Internet. For example, the email server of the company, the web server and so on. These servers will never initiate a connection to the inside of the company network.

- Frontend Network (FE): in a backend/frontend structured network, servers in the FE network are reachable from external networks (mainly Internet) and will relay clients’ requests to backend servers to handle them. An example of these servers an SMTP MX relay who will accept emails from external sources, and after antivirus/antispam analysis, it will relay the email to a backend server hosting the recipient mailbox.
3. LEVELS, CRITICALITY, COMMUNITY AND SID.

In order to implement our selection algorithm we introduce four notions. Each one will impact the final decision.

3.1 Levels

Before talking about levels, let’s just remind the reader that this algorithm is linked to the IPMS architecture. In IPMS we said that honeyd based sensors will be put in different places in the network. So the level will reflect the placement of each sensor in the network. As a consequence, when a sensor sends collected data to the analysis engine, we will have an exact idea about the network that the attack has reached. So levels will be: DMZ, FE, BE, DataLan and userLan as defined previously.

Obviously, an attack which reached the BE network is more critical than an attack which was detected in the DMZ or FE networks. Thus, we associate a weight to every level as follows:

1. DMZ : 10
2. FE : 20
3. BE : 40
4. dataLan : 80
5. userLan : 100

These values can be changed by the IPMS administrator to reflect the real impact of a security breach on business. Of course, if we have multiple VLANs in userLan level (for example, a vlan for normal users and a VLAN for IT admins) the administrator must set the weight by VLAN.

3.2 Criticality

The IPMS is mainly based on honeyd sensors to collect data and trigger other actions. But at the same time, the IPMS can use data from other network devices like intrusion detection systems (IDS) or any device which is IDMEF/IDXp [9, 10] capable. So we can introduce the notion of certainty: an IDS is more certain than a honeyd sensor when it reports an attack because it is based on attacks’ signatures so the probability of false positive is nearly inexistent.

Based on this, we can add a factor in conjunction with the weight to have a more realistic idea of attack’s impact.
3.3 Community

The IPMS is a distributed and collaborative prevention system. The principle of Community is introduced to make a filtering decision spread beyond the enterprise network to other subsidiaries or other companies with the same security needs (like partners for example). If a community is set all networks sharing the same community must share the same levels and criticality, or at least be homogeneous in term of network structure.

3.4 SID, Sensor Identifier

The three notions previously introduced let us define the SID of a sensor by the expression:

SID := <level> . <ID> . <Criticality | default := 1> . [Community | default := 0]

- <level> : mandatory field, contains the level of the sensor
- <ID> : mandatory field, contains the unique identifier of the sensor. This identifier is automatically generated by the IPMS when a new sensor is added
- <Criticality | default := 1> : mandatory field, contains the criticality factor, if not specified by the IPMS administrator the default value is 1 (neutral)
- [Community | default := 0] : optional field, contains the community id, if not specified by the administrator the default value is 0.

For example, the sensor with ID 15, in the frontend network with no criticality factor will have the SID : 20.15.1.0

4. FILTERING DEVICE SELECTION ALGORITHM.

After having defined level, criticality, community and SID notions we present the algorithm to select on which filtering device, known as filtering subsystem in the IPMS architecture, will be concerned by a decision of blocking a specified IP address, or IPb as noted in the introduction.

4.1 The algorithm

Array Tab_SID[] ; /* temporary array to hold SIDs */
Array Tab_Devs[] ; /* temporary array to hold IP addresses of determined filtering devices by the algorithm */
Array Tab_Nets[] ; /* temporary array to hold networks’ addresses determined by the algorithm */

Struct A_BLOQUER{
    String IP_SOURCE ;
    String IP_DESTINATION ;
    String PORT_SOURCE ;
    String PORT_SOURCE ;
} /* A structure to hold information used for filter definition. Elements of the structure are given as indication */

Struct A_BLOQUER a_bloquer ; /* definition of a variable based on previously defined structure */

/***** Step 2: functions prototypes *****/
level get_level (SID) ; /* this function returns the level associated to an SID */
SID[] get_SID_by_level (level) ; /* this function returns an array of SIDs of a given level */
string get_net_from_ip(SID) ; /* this function returns the IP address of a given sensor / SID */
string[] get_filtering_device_by_net (string) ; /* this function returns an array of IP addresses associated to a filtering device in a given IP subnet */

Boolean apply_filter (IP=b, A_BLOQUER) /* this function applies a filtering rule. Rules are in a variable of type A_BLOQUER and are applied to filtering device with the IP address given as parameter */

Array Tab_levels [] ; /* this array is generated based on levels defined by the administrator in the IPMS configuration. */
/**** Step 2: Algorithm *****/
If (IS_ATTACK == TRUE) then
/* we get the level of the sensor who captured the suspected traffic */
l ← get_level (SID) ;

/* we get SIDs of all sensors having a level lower than or equal to the one who captured the suspected traffic */
for (int i=0 ; i<sizeof(Tab_Levels) ; i++) {
  if ( (li ← Tab_Levels[i]) > l)  then
    exit for loop
  end if
  Tab_SID[] ← get_sid_by_level(li) ;  // push
}

/* getting IP networks’ addresses of sensors with SIDs determined in the previous for loop */
i ← 0;
while ( i < sizeof(Tab_SID) ) do
  Tab_Nets[] ← get_net_from_ip(i) ;  // push
End while

/* finally, we get IP addresses of filtering devices in the networks determined in the previous while loop */
i ← 0;
while ( i < taille(Tab_Nets) ) do
  IP_Devs[] ← get_filtering_device_in_net(i) ;  // push
  End while

/* we apply filtering rules on each filtering device*/
i ← 0;
while ( i < taille(Tab_Devs) ) do
  if ( Apply_filter(Tab_Devs[i], a_bloquer) ) then
    Actions to do after the filtering rule has been successfully applied to a device.
  else
    Actions to do in case of failure while applying filtering rules to a device.
  End if
  End while
End if

4.2 Execution of the algorithm

The algorithm starts by determining the level of the sensor that captured the suspected data and led to a decision of blocking the source IP address. The idea behind this step is to:

- Have a clear idea of how many sensors were in the path of this attack and network data was not suspected, which may indicate a problem in decision scheme
- Have all IP networks that belongs to the same level (or a lower one) than the current sensor as we may have different IP addresses for the same level (think about userLan with multiple VLANs)

Once this is done, we can have all IP addresses of filtering devices in the networks we determined in the first step of the execution. This will allow us to filter network traffic in all these devices without missing any one either in the network with the sensor or in remote networks.

The community was not introduced in the present algorithm as it is just for demonstration.

4.3 Tests and results

As in our previous article [1], filtering devices were based on Linux boxes with iptables. RSH (Remote SHell) was used to remotely apply new chains to the filtering device. To simulate a large network of filtering devices virtual machines were used on multiple hosts and with multiple virtual networks.

We also presented (in [1]) the algorithm used to fire the filtering action by using the function “ConfigureDevice(Rule)”. We can alter this function to integrate the algorithm presented in this article.
The algorithm executed as expected and filtering rules were dispatched as expected. The execution showed also that some rules do not need to be implemented on some filtering devices systematically. For example, if an IP is blocked in the very most peripheral filtering device what will be the need to reapply the same rule on all internal ones? And finally, for userLan level, maybe filtering by IP will not be efficient as in the case of using DHCP for example, the user could change its IP address and retry with his attack. Of course, we can go with DHCP reservations but integrating a lower level filtering (MAC address) for userLan may be necessary. We can update the algorithm with a check of the filtering to apply depending on the level of the sensor. For our case, our primary target is Internet attacks and IP filtering, so we don’t go further in this path for the moment.

5. CONCLUSION.

In this article we tried to improve the IPMS platform [1] by automating the selection of filtering device on which a filtering rule has to be applied. Nevertheless, and as discussed in the results, we can improve this algorithm to adapt further to real word cases.

The notion of community adds a level of complexity to the platform as it adds the need of securing communication with external networks. When sharing a filtering rule over internet this communication should be secured.

From another hand, an organization would not share all private network configuration with its partners, so a way to distribute the algorithm using agent based calculation, meaning having an agent in every network instead of a centralized method.

Having all information about network configuration, even encrypted, in one place make it a good target for attacks above all when information for remote access is also stored in the same location. So special care should be taken for securing this platform’s servers

REFERENCES


